Category Archives: Analysis

How to improve EBITDA margin from 28% to 43% in 12 months

T-Mobile in the Netherlands continues its rally towards higher EBITDA margin: One year ago, it was 28%. Now it’s 43%. T-Mobile’s reported figures shows just how sensitive sales costs are to the mobile business margin.

T-Mobile NL SAC SRC EBITDA churn dev

In Q4 2013, T-Mobile cut its subscriber retention cost (SRC) from a level above 200 EUR to less than half. It has stayed at the new, lower, level since. Even though done during fourth quarter – where margin normally is weak due to seasonal sales – T-Mobile’s EBITDA margin took a leap upwards quarter-to-quarter. Another leap came in Q1 2014 when T-Mobile sold its fixed business (traded under the “Online” brand).

In the just-reported third quarter, T-Mobile’s EBITDA margin took yet a leap: This time due to a significant reduction in contract SAC (subscriber acquisition cost).

The text book says that such dramatic reductions in SAC/SRC would immediately penalise T-Mobile who would experience a shrinking base and market share since existing customers would churn out and new customers would’t join. The interesting thing is that existing customers haven’t left: The orange curve shows a stabilising contract churn of about 15%. T-Mobile has, however, still experienced a decline in their total base, but this has mainly been within prepaid. [The reported reduction in Q3 was almost exclusively to the disposal of the Simpel brand].

According to T-Mobile, the answer to how this has been possible comes in two parts:

  • Increasing mobile data usage and revenue
  • Increasing revenue from equipment

In a market where T-Mobile’s two current MNO competitors KPN and Vodafone both go in the converged multi-play direction, it will be interesting to follow if T-Mobile can stay on this route – especially as Tele2 is about to enter the Dutch market as MNO within short.

Quad and convergent play: tefficient provides fact-based recommendations

quad signAnalysis & Go-to-market, 2014

How have operators introduced mobile-fixed convergent quad-play in Europe’s most advanced markets France, Spain, Portugal – and in emerging quad markets like Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK and Germany? How has competition reacted?

Using facts: How have these quad introductions affected market share, churn, acquisition & retention cost, demand for mobile, fibre-speed broadband and TV – and revenue and margin? Which defensive actions can non-convergent operators take?

Which factors can be attributed to effective take-up of quad play? Market share, fibre deployment and homepass, TV offers, exclusive content – or is it just about bundling discounts? What discount levels are we talking about?

Based on international facts and best practice, what would tefficient recommend? Taking local conditions, operator strategy and market position into account.

Commissioned by two operators.

Early upgrade plans: Sweet now. Turns sour?

early upgrade plans analysis 5 2014The equipment instalment plan has proven capable of substituting the subsidy model in mobile – even in traditional subsidy markets like the USA and the UK.

While the EIP opens for more competitive service pricing, it also opens for flexibility when it comes to equipment upgrades: Pay remaining instalments – and upgrade. Some operators go further, though:

Realising that customers aren’t particularly interested in obtaining the ownership of (aged) equipment, pioneering operators introduced a variant of the EIP – based on an early return of equipment: The early upgrade plan.

It’s a recurring upgrade promise – often without any additional fee. Take-up has been great, but it’s only now the pioneering operators need to start delivering on this promise.

Download analysis: tefficient industry analysis 5 2014 early upgrade plans 19 Sep

“Build it, and they will come” – 4G LTE in Europe

In four of the largest European markets – Germany, France, UK and Spain – we see three out of four mobile operators reporting their 4G LTE rollout status. Most of them also report (or indicate) their 4G LTE customer base.

After much hesitation, the 4G LTE rollout eventually started also in Europe. And you know what? Customers are coming. If they are covered, that is.

4G LTE stats DE FR Q2 2014

The country pictures show the overall market leader at the top. Telekom has the largest 4G LTE network in Germany and had 11% of its customer base on 4G LTE by the end of June.

In France, Bouygues Telecom shows how a small No 3 operator through aggressive focus on 4G LTE rollout can challenge the 2.5x larger Orange on the total 4G LTE customer base. 16% adoption is among the highest in Europe.

SFR – in the process of being acquired by Numericable – didn’t report their 4G LTE figures in Q2. Arcep, the French telecom regulator, however critisised SFR in June for their 4G LTE coverage claims, saying their population coverage was just 30%. [Bouygues and Orange claims were OK whereas also Free was critisised. Their population coverage was said to be 24%].

4G LTE stats UK Spain Q2 2014

UK is behind on 4G LTE rollout, partly because of late licensing. Market leader EE was given a head start when it was allowed to refarm 1800 MHz spectrum and use it for 4G LTE.

In Spain, market leader Movistar is behind Vodafone and Orange on 4G LTE rollout. Telefónica doesn’t report the number of 4G LTE customers in Movistar which might be an indication of that it’s low.

Neither E-plus, Free, ‘3’ nor Yoigo report figures on 4G LTE. We see this an indication of them being behind on rollout and adoption. E-plus is now in the process of merging with O2.

Yoigo lost 53% of equipment sales as Telefónica reinstated handset subsidy

The economic crisis put significant pressure on the Spanish telcos. Telefónica (Movistar) and Vodafone each lost around 4 millions SIMs in the past two and a half years. Orange and Yoigo have fared much better. Yoigo, with its no-frills low cost profile, grew subscriber base from 3 to 4 million at the same time. But suddenly – in Q1 2014 – Yoigo’s total revenue fell 26% quarter-on-quarter.

In TeliaSonera’s new reporting format – implemented Q2 2014 – we could see why total revenue fell: Equipment revenue declined 53% quarter-to-quarter. We could also see that in Q4 2013, 40% of Yoigo’s total revenue stemmed from equipment sales. By any standard, that is high.

Spain mobile equipment revenue dev 2012 2014

Why was it so high? In March 2012, Telefónica decided to abandon handset subsidisation altogether. It had an immediate negative impact on Telefónica’s equipment revenue: From Q2 to Q3 2012, equipment revenue fell from 300 to 150 MEUR (see graph). When Telefónica didn’t any longer discount customer equipment, customers bought it elsewhere. Vodafone followed the market leader and stopped subsidisation as well. Orange did not – and had a few easy quarters during which it churned over customers from Telefónica and Vodafone. Yoigo’s differentiation was instead its low service prices. Many cost-aware mobile users went to Yoigo for this reason, even if it meant that they had to pay the full price of a handset. Yoigo’s service revenue was low, but it was compensated by an increasing revenue from equipment sales…

…until Telefónica decided that they saved enough. The inserted frame in the graph shows that Telefónica grew handset sales 40% in Q1 2014 and 61% in Q2. At the same time, Telefónica’s margin fell. Equipment revenue expanded, but not in line with the number of handsets sold. All this together signal handset subsidisation. Telefónica: back in the game. Yoigo: equipment sales halfed.

TeliaSonera was for a long time open about their interest in selling Yoigo. With the improved results 2012 and 2013, that message changed. But after the Q1 2014 surprise, TeliaSonera put Yoigo back on the transfer list. All of Yoigo’s revenue expansion 2012-2013 was based on hardware sales. A weak foundation when the market leader changes direction.

Why “grandfathering” is a four letter word inside Verizon and AT&T

Verizon It’s been more than two years since the June 2012 launch of Verizon’s shared data plan which took out all other Verizon postpaid plans at one go. From this point on, new Verizon customers (or prolonging customers) had to take the Share Everything plan (later renamed More Everything). The initiative was Verizon’s final attempt to get rid of unlimited data and make usage-based data monetisation a reality.

Since the standard US postpaid contract is running for 24 months, we should after two years consequently see a 100% adoption of Share/More Everything within Verizon’s postpaid accounts? No, it is 55%.

at&t logoVerizon’s primary competitor, AT&T, launched their shared data plan, Mobile Share, in August 2012. Unlike Verizon, they kept other postpaid plans available to begin with. More than one year later, in October 2013, Mobile Share was eventually made the only plan. AT&T reports that 56% of their postpaid SIMs are on Mobile Share. Still not 100%.

In its Q2 reporting of yesterday, AT&T says that 80% of postpaid smartphone subscribers are on usage-based data plans. Leaving 20% of smartphone subscribers (plus a bunch of data-only subscribers – no reporting for that segment) that still are unlimited.

Verizon and AT&T’s principal method to convince customers to let go of their unlimited plans has been equipment subsidy: You wouldn’t get any unless you go for the new plans.

But T-Mobile’s disruption of the subsidy model – later embraced by AT&T and (somewhat reluctantly) implemented by Verizon – has led to US customers shifting away from subsidy, instead going for installment plans or BYOD. And with these models, customers can easier hold onto their grandfathered unlimited data plans.

Telenor and ‘3’ sell more equipment than Telia and Tele2 – or?

TeliaSonera started to separate out equipment revenue in their new reporting format. Lovely!

Sweden equipment revenue of mobile revenue ratio 2012 2014

We can now compare the equipment revenue vs. mobile revenue ratio for all Swedish operators (see graph). According to reporting notes, Telenor and ‘3’ realise the full equipment price as equipment revenue and let the equipment subsidy dilute service revenue instead. Telia and Tele2 realise the actual equipment sales price after subsidy as equipment revenue.

Active in the same market, there is likely no material difference between the equipment sales of the operators; the differences between Telenor/’3′ on one side and Telia/Tele2 on the other are rather a consequence of the revenue recognition used.

If so, we can by comparing these two approaches estimate that Swedish operators averagely subsidise around one third of the nominal equipment price. That is how much Telia and Tele2’s lines would have to be raised to match the lines of Telenor and ‘3’.

The risk of being too ungenerous with data allowance

The Danish mobile market – with 4 operators in a country with less than 6 million inhabitants – has always been very competitive and price-centric. So far, only the market leading incumbent TDC has fared relatively well – but the question is if that is about to change.

Unlike its competitors, TDC has been very restrictive with data allowances. TDC is still even restricting voice use on most of its plans.

Denmark data usage vs SIM 2H 2013

At tefficient, we like regulators who publish not only the total usage volumes of their country, but break it down on the individual operators – like Erhvervsstyrelsen does for Denmark. The graph above compares the SIM market share with the data traffic market share: TDC has 41% of the Danish SIMs but just 14% of the data traffic. ‘3’ is TDC’s antipode: 12% of the SIMs but 38% of Denmark’s mobile data traffic.

Denmark 199 DKK plan contents

A comparison of what a mobile smartphone customer gets for 199 DKK [27 EUR] demonstrates the allowance difference well. What the table doesn’t show is that TDC gives significant multi-user discounts on more expensive plans – and that TDC allows every smartphone user to attach up to 3 data-SIMs under the same allowance without any additional fee. [Telenor has lately partly matched some of this].

Still, the mobile users with an interest for mobile data – undoubtedly the future – seem to prefer TDC’s competitors: The average TDC phone SIM used 250 Mbytes of data per month during 2H 2013. Telenor had 530, Telia 680 and ‘3’ 1170 Mbytes. The average TDC data-only SIM used 650 Mbytes. Telenor had 2600, Telia 4200 and ‘3’ 5100 Mbytes per month.

The competitive context has sharpened further as Telenor and Telia have launched their new, shared, network. A network test – ordered by Telenor – showed that the new Telenor/Telia network is best in Denmark. Marketing has had its point towards TDC.

In what appears to be a reaction, TDC has recently increased some of their data allowances – especially in the multi-user plans.

The case should serve as learning for operators in general: Whereas we’ve spoken much about the risk of being too generous with data allowance it’s perhaps time to address the risk of being too ungenerous?